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 NOTE 
Let Me In:  The Right of Access to 
Business Disputes Conducted in State 
Courts 
Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013). 
DAVID W. BROWN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Arbitrations are popular in business disputes, and Delaware is a haven for 
businesses.
1
  The Delaware legislature, in an attempt to make the state even 
friendlier to businesses, enacted laws that allowed them to use the court system as 
an arbitration venue away from the prying eyes of the public and press.
2
  In an 
attempt to protect First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, the 
Delaware Coalition for Open Government brought suit against the judges who 
were overseeing the arbitrations.
3
  In Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. 
Strine, the Third Circuit held that the public has a right to access these proceed-
ings and that statutes barring public access are unconstitutional.
4
  This decision is 
the subject of this note. 
After examining the history of the First Amendment right of access to civil 
proceedings, this note will analyze how the two-pronged historical test applies to 
arbitrations conducted in a state court.
5
  The prongs of the test — experience and 
logic — provide the framework for the analysis conducted in this note.6  This note 
argues the analysis conducted in Strine was the correct approach, and suggests the 
implementation of Sunshine Laws similar to those in other states as a constitution-
ally permissible alternative that would satisfy the holding in Strine. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
This case concerns a suit brought by the Delaware Coalition for Open Gov-
ernment (the Coalition) against the defendant judges of the Delaware Court of 
                                                          
 *  B.S., Truman State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2016; Journal of Dispute Resolution, Lead Articles Editor, 2015-16.  I would like to thank Professor 
Douglas Abrams for his helpful insight while writing this Note.  I would also like to thank the staff of 
the Journal of Dispute Resolution, who edited this Note, for the significant time and effort they dedi-
cated throughout the entire process.  
 1. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), available at 
http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf. 
 2. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 521. 
 5. Id. at 514. 
 6. Id. 
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Chancery.
7
  The Coalition is a non-profit corporation “dedicated to promoting and 
defending the people’s right to transparency and accountability in government.”8  
All defendants in the action were judges of the Court of Chancery whom the Coa-
lition claimed violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
when they served as arbitrators in confidential arbitrations conducted in the court.
9
 
In 2009, Delaware added a provision to the state code that expanded the pow-
er of the Court of Chancery to arbitrate business disputes.
10
  To qualify for this 
arbitration, at least one party must be a business formed or organized under Dela-
ware law,
11
 and neither party can be a consumer.
12
  The court’s power to arbitrate 




The Coalition argued this practice of confidential court proceedings violated a 
First Amendment right held by the press and the public to access civil trials.
14
  
The Coalition’s claim rested on the assertion that the First Amendment contains a 
presumptive right of access to judicial proceedings.
15
  Defendants argued that the 
proceedings at issue are not similar to civil trials, and that the Delaware practices 
should therefore be upheld.
16
  The United States District Court in Delaware grant-
ed the Coalition’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling the Delaware 




On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 
the district court and held that when a state conducts arbitration proceedings 
through its court system the proceedings are similar to civil trials, and when 
viewed through the Supreme Court tests of “experience” and “logic” the public 
has a First Amendment right of access to such proceedings.
18
 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The analysis in the instant case focuses on Title 10 Section 349 of the Dela-
ware Code and its constitutionality under the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.
19
  This section will present the Delaware rules at issue in 
Strine as well as the history of judicial interpretation of the First Amendment as a 
                                                          
 7. Complaint at 1, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 
1:11–1015). 
 8. Id.  See also About DelCOG, DELCOG.ORG, www.delcog.org/about (last visited May 19, 2015) 
(explaining that the Coalition is a state branch of the National Freedom of Information Coalition whose 
goal is “promoting and defending the people’s right to transparency and accountability in govern-
ment”). 
 9. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1. 
 10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2009). 
 11. Id. at § 347(a)(3). 
 12. Id. at § 2731 (defining consumer as “an individual who purchases or leases merchandise pri-
marily for personal, family or household purposes”). 
 13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347(a)(5). 
 14. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (the case at issue was 
brought in federal court as it raises a claim under the United States Constitution). 
 15. Complaint, supra note 7, at 4. 
 16. Strine, 733 F.3d at 513. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 521. 
 19. Id. at 513. 
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right held by the public to access court proceedings.  This section will also present 
a case from a California court of appeals regarding judicial arbitration in that state 
where a similar holding was reached. 
A.  The Delaware Rule 
The Delaware Chancery Court Rules state that after parties agree to arbitra-
tion, a Chancery Court arbitration proceeding can begin.
20
  The Chancery Court 
judge has authority to order a remedy he or she deems just and equitable as long 
as the order is within the scope of the parties’ agreement.21   The judge’s award 
automatically becomes an order of the Court of Chancery.
22
  The arbitration pro-
ceedings are considered confidential and are made public only when an aggrieved 
party appeals the Court of Chancery opinion to the Supreme Court of Delaware.
23
  
Only parties and their representatives may attend the arbitration proceedings, un-
less the parties agree otherwise.
24
  All materials and communications remain con-
fidential except in two circumstances:  when the parties agree to waive confidenti-
ality, or when the confidential materials are subject to discovery and were not 
prepared specifically for the arbitration hearing.
25
 
B.  First Amendment Right of Access 
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, the Third Circuit held that the press 
and the public maintain a constitutional and common law right of access to civil 
proceedings.
26
  The actions stemmed from defendant Cohen’s attempt to buy a 
large amount of stock and gain a controlling share of Publicker.
27
  Publicker filed 
suit alleging Cohen had failed to make required disclosures in his attempt to pur-
chase the stock.
28
  Publicker also moved for a temporary restraining order to stop 
Cohen from soliciting and using proxies at the upcoming shareholders meeting.
29
  
At the hearing on the motion, it was first mentioned that if specified information 
were released concerning some of Publicker’s business operations at the upcom-
ing shareholder’s meeting, Publicker could suffer adverse effects.30  Cohen re-
quested the court require Publicker to disclose the information or postpone the 
                                                          
 20. DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(b) (West 2010). 
 21. Id. at 98(f)(1). 
 22. Id. at 98(f)(3). 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (West 2009). 
 24. DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(b) (West 2010). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 27. Id. at 1062 (Cohen, defendant in the action, sought to take control of Publicker Industries by 
agreeing to buy a large amount of stock from a member of the Neuman family, who owned 37% of the 
stock in the company.  Cohen had also made an agreement with some members of the family to vote 
for them via proxy at the next shareholders meeting.  A member of the Neuman family who Cohen had 
not agreed with filed a separate suit alleging the agreement with the other Neuman family members 
violated a Pennsylvania law barring a shareholder from selling his or her voting rights or proxy.  A 
judge set aside the stock purchase agreement for being “without legal foundation”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
3
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meeting until it did so.
31




With a member of the media present in the courtroom, Publicker requested 
the judge close the proceedings except to necessary parties, stating the hearing’s 
purpose was to determine whether specified information should remain confiden-
tial.
33
  The court granted the request to close the proceedings, stating that the 
press’s presence destroyed the entire function of the hearing.34  Throughout the 
day, several other news sources attempted to gain access to the hearings, but were 
denied for the same reason as the first.
35
  The trial court found an “over-riding 
interest” in maintaining the confidentiality of the proceedings and admitting the 




Two entities that were denied access to the proceedings — Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. (PNI) and Dow Jones — appealed to the Third Circuit.37  In 
deciding whether the parties had a right of access to civil trials, the court of ap-
peals considered both a common law right and a First Amendment right.
38
  The 
panel in Publicker cited Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale
39
 to determine whether 
the right of access was applicable in civil proceedings.  In Gannett, the Supreme 
Court held a defendant’s right to a public trial is “equally applicable to civil and 
criminal cases.”40  Gannett also recited the common law assumption that the pub-
lic has a right to attend trials, civil and criminal trials alike.
41
  Therefore, the court 




After establishing a common law right, the Third Circuit considered whether 
the Appellants PNI and Dow Jones had a First Amendment right of access to civil 
trials.
43
  Again, the court of appeals began by analyzing criminal trials.
44
  The 
panel cited Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, in which the United States 
Supreme Court held the First Amendment guarantees a right of access to criminal 
trials.
45
  The Richmond majority held the function of the First Amendment ensures 
“freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of govern-
ment,” and court proceedings are a central function of the government.46  Rich-
mond also held the First Amendment includes a right of access traditionally open 
to the public to exercise other First Amendment rights.
47
  The Supreme Court 
stated the courtroom has historically been open to the public and the media, and 
                                                          
 31. Id. 
 32. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1062. 
 33. Id. at 1063. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1064. 
 38. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1066. 
 39. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
 40. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979). 
 41. Id. at 385. 
 42. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1067. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)). 
 46. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
 47. Id. at 578. 
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their presence assures judicial proceedings possess “integrity.”48  Therefore, the 
court held the public had a right of access to criminal trials, but did not decide on 
the issue of public access to civil trials.
49
 
In Publicker, the Third Circuit had to decide whether Richmond’s analysis 
and rights concerning criminal trials was applicable to civil proceedings.
50
  To 
decide this, the court of appeals analyzed two principles from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court:  whether there is a 
presumption of openness in civil trials and whether that openness plays a signifi-
cant role in the judicial process and government.
51
 
In considering the presumption of openness, the Third Circuit in Publicker 
found a presumption of openness in the American court system could be traced 
back to English law where all trials were to be held in open court for the public to 
access.
52
  The court of appeals stated that access to court proceedings is “inherent 
in the nature of our democratic form of government.”53  The court further cited 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said public access to civil proceedings was 
central because it helped secure the “proper administration of justice,”54 and that 
“it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act 
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to 
satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is per-
formed.”55 
In deciding Publicker the Third Circuit held the advantages present in the 
openness of criminal trials as stated by the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper 
are also present in civil trials.
56
  In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court found 
the advantages of open civil proceedings included an appearance of fairness, 
which allows public participation to insure the proper administering of justice, and 
an increased public respect and education for the judicial system.
57
 
Globe Newspaper stands for the proposition that while there is a First 
Amendment right of access, that right is not absolute.
58
  To overcome the pre-
sumption of access it must be shown that there is an important government inter-
est and there is no less restrictive way to protect that interest.
59
  The presumption 
of openness can also be overcome where a party to a proceeding can show a 
“clearly defined and serious injury with specificity.”60 
After finding a First Amendment right of access to civil trials and a presump-
tion of openness, the Supreme Court in Publicker laid out the procedural and sub-
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 580. 
 50. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068. 
 51. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co., v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). 
 52. Id. (citing EDWARD JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (6th ed. 1967); Daubney v. 
Cooper, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 438, (K.B.); 10 B. & C. 237, 240). 
 53. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1069 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 
1976)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Cowley v. Pulsifier, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 607). 
 60. Id. at 1070-71 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 
(E.D. Pa. 1981)). 
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stantive requirements for denying access to civil proceedings.
61
  Procedurally, a 
court denying access must identify the interest it is attempting to protect and must 
sufficiently articulate those findings so that a reviewing court can determine if the 
denial of access was proper.
62
  To satisfy the substantive requirement, a court must 
find “an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”63 
Applying these standards in Publicker, the Third Circuit held the district court 
satisfied the procedural requirement in closing the proceedings, but failed to satis-
fy the substantive requirement.
64
  The court said the district court abused its dis-
cretion in considering Publicker’s preliminary injunction motion at the same 
closed proceeding in which it considered the closing of confidential information.
65
  
The district court made no note of a confidentiality interest or alternatives to clos-




These precedents led the Supreme Court to establish a test, enunciated in 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California.
67
  In Press, the Court con-
sidered a case in which members of the press were denied access to the transcripts 
of a preliminary hearing of a criminal prosecution and sued the court overseeing 
the proceedings.
68
  The Court noted this was a First Amendment right of access 
issue and dismissed the defense’s argument that the right applied only to trials.69  
The Court stated a two-part test to identify whether a person has a First Amend-
ment right of access.
70
  First, a court must consider whether both the place and the 
type of proceeding have historically been accessible by the public.
71
  Second, it 
must be considered whether access by the public plays a significant and positive 
role in the proceeding.
72
  The Court labeled these the tests of “experience and 
logic.”73  In Press, the Court found both tests were satisfied, and held the denial of 
access to the preliminary hearing transcripts was a violation of the First Amend-
ment right of access.
74
 
Applying similar law, a California court decided against the allowance of pri-
vate judge-ran arbitrations.
75
  Heenan involved a superior court judge who con-
ducted a private arbitration between two parties.
76
  Plaintiffs in the case hired the 
defendant as a general contractor and later sued claiming defective work.
77
  De-
fendant countersued for unpaid fees.
78
  The parties agreed, after court encourage-
                                                          
 61. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070, 1071. 
 62. Id. at 1071 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986)). 
 63. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1071 (citing Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 9-10)). 
 64. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1072-74. 
 65. Id. at 1072. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 68. Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal. 478 U.S. 1, 4 (1986). 
 69. Id. at 7. 
 70. Id. at 8. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 8. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13-14. 
 75. Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995 (2002). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 998. 
 78. Id. 
6
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ment, to partake in arbitration before a sitting superior court judge.
79
  The court 
labeled the action a “judicial binding arbitration” which resulted in the judge mail-
ing an award decision in favor of Plaintiffs.
80
  This award was not filed in the 
court, so Plaintiffs then had to file an order to enforce the award, which was then 
appealed, leading to the analysis by the Court of Appeals.
81
 
Prior to Heenan, California law permitted binding judicial arbitration.
82
  The 
Court of Appeals stated contractual arbitration must take place outside the courts 
and the only judicial involvement should be the enforcement of an award.
83
  The 
court cited precedent that addressed many of the same policy concerns the Third 
Circuit did through precedent in Strine, stating that judging must be done in view 
of the public with appropriate appellate review to satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice.
84
  Therefore, the appeals court ruled the orders and procedures invalid.
85
 
This precedent, specifically the tests of experience and logic used to decide 
First Amendment access cases, guided the Third Circuit’s decision in Strine. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In deciding the case at hand, the Third Circuit applied the experience and log-
ic test, as described in Press, to determine if a First Amendment right of access 
existed.
86
  The court of appeals for the Third Circuit further reiterated precedent 
by stating that in order for a proceeding to qualify for public access, the tests of 
experience and logic must be satisfied,
87
 and if they were satisfied, only a compel-
ling government interest could override them.
88
  After acknowledging this formula 
as the appropriate test, the court ultimately found the district court did not apply 
the formula
89
 and the decision was therefore overturned.
90
 
A.  Experience:  History of Arbitration 
The Third Circuit began its analysis with the “experience” prong of the Press 
test.
91
  Noting the parties disagreed over what history was relevant,
92
 the court of 
appeals decided on a broad historical approach that reaches both civil trials and 
arbitrations.
93
  Citing Publicker, the panel explained the history of access to civil 
trials as well as the courthouse itself.
94
  Further, the court found the tradition of 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Heenan, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 998. 
 82. Id. at 1000. 
 83. Id. at 1001. 
 84. Id. at 1002 (citing TJX Cos., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 747, 754 (2001)). 
 85. Id. at 1004. 
 86. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 87. Id. (citing N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 88. Strine, 733 F.3d at 514 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984)). 
 89. Id. at 514. 
 90. Id. at 515. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (the judges argued only the history of arbitrations should be used while the Coalition argued 
only the history of civil trials should be used in the experience analysis). 
 93. Id. at 516. 
 94. Strine, 733 F.3d at 516 (citing Publicker Ind., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068-70 (3d Cir. 
1984)). 
7
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access stems from English law and continues in the American legal tradition; 
therefore, the court concluded the experience prong pointed toward openness 
when considering civil trials.
95
 
The court devoted more time to the history of arbitrations for its “experience” 
analysis.
96
  The court noted the prevalence of arbitration throughout history, and 
concluded early arbitrations in England were held in public venues and involved 
the community.
97
  In America, arbitrations allowed parties skeptical of the estab-
lished legal system to resolve disputes privately.
98
  As arbitrations became more 
common because of the ever-increasing amount of business in America, members 
of the judiciary began overseeing arbitrations outside of their official roles as 
judges.
99
  After the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, courts treated 




The court found that in modern times a member of an organization whose 
sole function is conducting arbitrations are often the ones who organize arbitration 
in the first place.
101
  The court noted a distinction between modern arbitrations and 
the way they were historically conducted — finding that now arbitrations are en-
tirely private unless the parties agree to open proceedings.
102
 
Next, the court noted conflict in the public nature of arbitrations throughout 
history, but also stated they have often been closed in more modern times.
103
  
Further, the court said this closure is part of the nature of arbitrations because they 
serve as a private alternative to traditional court proceedings.
104
  Considering the 
history of both civil trials and arbitrations together, the court recognized a con-
trast:  civil trials have historically been open, but arbitrations not conducted by the 
state are often closed to the public.
105
  With that history in mind, the court noted 
the Delaware proceedings at issue shared many characteristics with traditional 
arbitrations, including “informality, flexibility, and limited review.”106  However, 
the court found the proceedings to differ from other arbitrations because the result 




In concluding its analysis of experience, the court stated the right of access to 
arbitrations conducted by courts is “deeply rooted in the way the judiciary func-
tions in a democratic society,” and stated Publicker’s historical analysis was simi-
                                                          
 95. Id. (citing Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due 
Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 318-19 (2012)). 
 96. Id. at 516. 
 97. Id. at 517 (citing Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century 
England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 29, 33-34 (1984)). 
 98. Id. at 517 (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES 
WITHOUT LAWYERS 4 (1983)). 
 99. Id. at 517 (citing Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the 
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 475 (1984)). 
 100. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: 
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT VOL. 1, § 4.1.2 
(1999)). 
 101. Id. at 517. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 518. 
 104. Id. at 517. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517. 
 107. Id. 
8
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lar.
108
  The court found the experience prong favored public access to arbitral 
proceedings because the place and type of proceeding have traditionally been 
open to the public.
109
 
B.  Logic 
The Third Circuit also analyzed the logic prong of the Press test.
110
  Under 
this prong, the court examined whether the public’s access plays a significant 
positive role in these particular proceedings.
111
  The court presented six potential 
benefits that have been previously ascribed as benefits to open proceedings: 
(1) promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by provid-
ing the public with the more complete understanding of the [proceed-
ing]; 
(2) promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved 
only by permitting full public view of the proceedings; 
(3) providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility and emotion; 
(4) serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the [proceeding] 
to public scrutiny; 
(5) enhancement of the performance of all involved; and 
(6) discouragement of [fraud].
112
 
The court found all of these goals could be reached through open proceed-
ings.
113
  Acknowledging the significant benefits of an open process, the court also 
found potential drawbacks as argued by the defendant judges was relatively mi-
nor.
114
  The court first looked to the judges’ argument that the closed proceedings 
protect confidential information, such as trade secrets, that may then end up being 
shared by businesses.
115
  The court dismissed this argument, finding those types of 
sensitive information to be already protected by the Chancery Court Rules.
116
 
Addressing the second argument made by the judges, who stated confidential-
ity protected companies involved in arbitration from “loss of prestige and good-
will,”117 the court found that while this loss may be “unpleasant” for the parties, it 
does not actually interfere with the proceedings or hinder the public good.
118
  Ex-




                                                          
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517 (quoting PG Publ’g. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal brackets in original)). 
 113. Id. at 517. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (quoting DEL. CH. CT. R. 5.1 (West 2014) (Rule 5.1 provides for confidential filing of docu-
ments that contain trade secrets, financial, business, or personal information)). 
 117. Id. at 517 (quoting Appellants’ Brief at 60, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 
(3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3859)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517. 
9
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The final argument made by the defendant judges was that opening the pro-
ceedings could actually end Delaware’s arbitration program.120  The court did not 
agree, and concluded this point of view assumed the only advantage of arbitration 
over regular civil proceedings is arbitration’s privacy.121  The court however 
points out that the judges themselves spent much of their brief attempting to point 
out the differences between the two.
122
  The court noted several differences, in-
cluding the fact arbitrations are entered into by consent, they are marked by “pro-
cedural flexibility,” and their awards are subject to limited appellate review.123 
The court found this logic test prong also favored open proceedings and any 
potential drawbacks were not compelling.
124
  The court held because there existed 
a tradition of accessibility to government-sponsored arbitrations, and because 
public access was an integral part of the process, the First Amendment right of 
access applies to these arbitrations.
125
  The Supreme Court of the United States 
has denied the writ of certiorari sought by the judges.
126
 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Julio Fuentes articulated the Third Circuit’s 
decision was not a sweeping destruction of Delaware’s arbitration proceedings.127  
Judge Fuentes found because the decision concerned the First Amendment right of 
access, the court of appeals struck down only the portions of the Delaware code 
and Chancery Court rules invoking private proceedings.
128
  Therefore, the majori-
ty’s decision did nothing to eliminate Delaware proceedings, and instead opened 
them to the press and public.
129
 
C.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Jane Roth wrote a dissenting opinion articulating disagreement with the 
majority’s analysis of experience and logic.130  Judge Roth differed regarding 
what must be analyzed as part of history — concluding that arbitrations are the 
only relevant history.
131
  This analysis is opposed to that of the majority, which 
deemed it relevant to include an analysis of the history of civil trials.
132
  After 
analyzing the history of arbitrations, Judge Roth concluded arbitrations have been 
and continue to be held privately.
133
  For the logic prong of the test, she concluded 
arbitrations involving private information must remain private so that parties are 
not subject to detriment from the information being available to the public and 
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competitors.
134




The decision in Strine raises an interesting issue of how far states can go in 
overseeing the arbitrations conducted within their borders.  Further, as made ap-
parent by the dissenting opinion, there are drastically different ways to employ 
and interpret the precedent that is usually relied on in First Amendment access 
cases. 
V.  COMMENT 
With the holding in Strine, the Third Circuit established a rule that continues 
the historical trend of keeping court proceedings open to the public, and also more 
clearly defines what an arbitration can and cannot be.  This decision is applicable 
to more than one state, but most obviously impacts Delaware where the law origi-
nated and possibly implicates that state’s status as a corporate mecca.  This section 
analyzes the court’s decision in light of the policies the Third Circuit considered, 
the merits of the dissent, and discusses possible alternatives to the arbitration pro-
gram that would not violate the First Amendment right of access. 
A.  Policy Considerations 
Public access to official court proceedings has enjoyed a long and prominent 
history in American jurisprudence.  That fact held much weight in the majority 
decision, and ultimately led to the ruling in Strine.
136
  Unfortunately for businesses 
who desire closed arbitrations, it appears the major draw to Delaware’s arbitration 
process was access to a judge behind closed doors, one who also had the power to 
hand down binding court awards.
137
  The benefit this arbitration system offered 
over other arbitration programs was private access to a judge with the power of 
the court behind him.
138
  There are other entities that can provide confidentiality 
and still produce a binding agreement.
 139
  Therefore, this ruling does not signifi-
cantly harm any potential parties to the court-sponsored arbitration. 
Any harm stemming from these secret arbitrations to the parties themselves is 
minimal; however, the harm to the public and the court system is potentially vast.  
Before this decision was reached, public and press were both being denied access 
to the private arbitration proceedings, including filings and dockets they were 
entitled to by the First Amendment.  The Delaware arbitration program also al-
lowed judges to act without accountability because their decisions were private 
and had limited review.  As discussed above, First Amendment access is not pure-
ly meant for the benefit of the people, but also ensures the accountability of the 
courts and government to the citizens.  This latter function was not being served 
by these Delaware arbitrations.  The Third Circuit was faced with the accountabil-
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ity of a court that was acting out of the public eye without a compelling interest to 
do so. 
The California case discussed previously, Heenan — is different from Strine 
—it involved statutory rules and was applicable in business disputes involving 
significant amounts of money.  These cases are reconcilable, and the analysis of 
the roles of the judge and the court should remain the same.  The judge is as an 
extension of the state, and as discussed through case law above, is required to 
conduct his or her duties in the eye of the public to maintain the rights of the peo-
ple.  Simply because Delaware has an interest in maintaining its allure to corpora-
tions does not release it from complying with the First Amendment. 
B.  Judge Roth’s Dissent 
Judge Roth’s dissent announced her disagreement with the majority’s defini-
tion of the appropriate history to be considered under the experience prong of the 
test.  Roth argues only the history of arbitration should have been relevant, while 
the majority opinion written by Judge Sloviter considers the history of both arbi-
tration and traditional court proceedings.  It seems Judge Roth’s opinion of history 
failed to consider what was actually taking place in the courtroom.  Her analysis 
focuses heavily on the goals of arbitration, rather than the implications of the pro-
cedure.  To ignore the history of public access to civil proceedings ignores how 
crucial the use of the judge and courtroom were to these arbitrations.  Disregard-
ing these events led to the conclusion that the history of open arbitrations alone 
was applicable and that Delaware’s program was constitutional. 
The Strine decision reaches beyond the bounds of what the Supreme Court 
has determined in arbitration cases.
140
  The Delaware arbitration program at issue 
was not subject to be barred based on the First Amendment.
141
  The history of 
criminal trials that the majority based much of the “experience” analysis on is 
inapplicable in this case because the history access to arbitrations is not as one-
sided as that of criminal trials.
142
  The judges in the Third Circuit majority recog-
nize a “mixed record of openness,”143 but still determined the history was suffi-
cient to require access.
144
  Ultimately, the Third Circuit might have interpreted the 
constitutional right of access too broadly, and in so doing inhibited the ability of 
states to enact creative solutions to their specific legal issues.
145
 
C.  A Constitutionally Permissible Alternative 
As noted in the concurrence by Judge Fuentes, arbitration through the court 
system is not unconstitutional.
146
  Some room for creativity was left when the 
Third Circuit decided this case.  Delaware is not barred from having a court-
operated arbitration program, but it is barred from having a confidential arbitration 
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system with sitting judges serving as the arbitrators in a courtroom.  This distinc-
tion allows Delaware to create an alternative program still capable of achieving 
the possible advantages of the program that has now been struck down. 
One option would be for Delaware to set up an arbitration program with for-
mer Chancery Court judges as the arbitrators.  The individuals would be familiar 
with applicable law and have experience handling business disputes; therefore, 
they would be able to reach a logical conclusion supported by law.  Given these 
are not sitting judges serving as arbitrators, the courtroom would no longer serve 
as the venue, and arbitrations would ultimately be confidential.  Such an approach 
solves the court’s confidentiality issue, and a court could later compel the arbitra-
tion order if one party does not cooperate in disposition.  If confidentiality is the 
key issue, then that problem becomes solved. 
California employs such a system, labeled “judicial arbitration.”147  Under 
this system, arbitrators include retired judges, members of the state bar, or even 
current judges as long as they are not compensated for their time.
148
  Regardless of 
party consent, a court can order these arbitrations,
149
 and if a party to the arbitra-
tion does not request a trial de novo or request a dismissal, the award is considered 
a judgment with the same effect as any other civil proceeding.
150
 
Arizona law establishes a similar arbitration system
151
 to the California sys-
tem, and the program has led to a high amount of satisfaction from those who 
have participated.
152
  Almost all of the lawyers polled (93%) who had represented 
clients in the arbitration program felt they were able to “fully present their case”153 
while 82% felt the arbitration was fair.
154
  However, the results from the survey 
were not all positive.  Just over half of the attorneys felt the arbitrators understood 
the issues involved in the case and only 50% thought the arbitrator was “very 
knowledgeable about arbitration procedures.”155  Strikingly, only one-third of the 
arbitrators polled were “very familiar” with the law in the cases they oversaw.156  
However, most of the arbitrators felt they had enough information to appropriately 
decide the matter.
157
  One important note is the arbitrators who reported being 
more familiar with pertinent law were more likely to report having enough rele-
vant information to make an informed decision in the case.
158
 
This data from Arizona reveals a high level of satisfaction among arbitration 
participants, but also sheds light on a potential limitation to such programs.  It 
appears from the data that arbitrator knowledge of pertinent law is vital in percep-
tion of the validity of the arbitrations.  As suggested above, a similar rule as that in 
California where retired judges or judges not serving in their official capacity 
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could serve as arbitrators could help alleviate some of the issues presented in the 
Arizona research. 
A program such as those employed in California and Arizona could work 
well as an alternative to the unconstitutional Delaware program.  The arbitration 
would be conducted confidentially and would result in an order from the Court, 
binding the parties.  This outcome was a main advantage of the Delaware arbitra-
tions.  A case could come before the Court of Chancery, and while the California 
and Arizona programs differ in that they do not require consent, if both parties 
request arbitration, one could be ordered and then handled outside of the court-
room for the remainder of the proceedings.  Many of the surrounding rules desig-
nated for the Court of Chancery arbitrations could stand, including amount in 
controversy and commercial party requirements. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For many years, Delaware has been a state creating pro-business legislation 
that welcomes corporations, and as a result, a Chancery Court system knowledge-
able in business law emerged.  Recently, with the creation of an arbitration pro-
gram with sitting judges as the arbitrators, Delaware maintained that reputation.  
In so doing, a system was created that violated a provision of the First Amend-
ment that serves both the public and the courts. 
Arbitrations are inherently confidential.  Court proceedings are inherently 
open.  The experiment conducted by Delaware attempting to combine those two 
conflicting interests failed, when the Third Circuit added to precedent favoring 
open court proceedings in Strine.  This decision does not in any way negate the 
advantages of arbitration, and does not seriously harm Delaware as a hub for busi-
ness.  Delaware was a desirable state for businesses before 2009 when the legisla-
tion was passed
159
 and will likely continue to be.  Courts and parties prefer arbitra-
tion over litigation for a variety of reasons, but the arguments put forward were 
insufficient to overcome the First Amendment right of access. 
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